THE INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN RELATIONS
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Dear Member of Congress:

The enclosed paper, "Reorganization of U. S. Intelligence," is the first in a series of studies prepared by the Institute of American Relations, a non-profit organization whose purpose it is to facilitate the cultivation and discussion of knowledge and understanding of the United States of America, its role in the world community, and of international and domestic affairs related thereto, through the undertaking of original research, publication of findings, etc.

"Reorganization of U. S. Intelligence" was written by Lt. General Daniel O. Graham, a leading expert in intelligence-related matters. Until his retirement on January 1 of this year, General Graham served as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Prior to assuming that post, General Graham served under then-CIA Director James Schlesinger, where he was charged with the duty of coordinating activities among the intelligence services.

A more detailed discussion of the points raised in General Graham's study will appear soon in the journal, "Strategic Review."

Please feel free to contact the Institute if you have any questions concerning the contents of this study.

Sincerely,

Victor Fediay

Dr. Victor A. Fediay
President

VAF/jc

REORGANIZATION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE

I. Summation

Why reorganize?

1. Congressional investigation has turned up several problem areas in intelligence, but only two reasons for reorganization: Covert action remains a necessary tool to promote U.S. interests abroad, but executive and legislative oversight of such action must be strengthened.

To permit intelligence personnel a channel for reporting intelligence activity which abuses the process, an Inspector General for Intelligence, not subordinate to the agencies involved, should be set up.

2. There are reasons quite apart from the Congressional inquiries which indicate the need for reorganization:

The changing nature of the world has changed U.S. intelligence needs. Political and economic intelligence can be as important now as military. The current broad overlap among agencies on purely military intelligence matters must be reduced to a minimum which still assures an independent review of military judgments of interest to top levels of government.

The needs for intelligence of tactical commanders in the field have increased sharply, including their needs for

support from national systems; enthusiasm for centralization must be tempered by this fact.

New technologies have outmoded current methods of tasking, operating and managing collection systems and disseminating the results.

The long-standing difficulties of the Director of the CIA attempting to speak both for his Agency and for all other agencies have been compounded by the serious image problem which has arisen in recent months.

The vital CIA functions of clandestine intelligence collection and covert action have become too easily compromised by the accretion in that Agency of broad areas of less sensitive functions.

What are the proposed solutions?

1. The Executive Branch has considered four options encapsulated here:

Leave the intelligence community as is. Not feasible. Congress will demand some change, and some change is necessary.

Give Director of CIA line authority over other agencies. Not feasible. In the current climate of public opinion more authority to CIA seems preposterous; also line authority over other departments' intelligence assets is unworkable.

Subordinate CIA to State or Defense. Not feasible. Congress would not aggrandize either the military or the Secretary of State in this manner. Such a scheme would go far in destroying the clandestine services.

Establish a separate position at White House level to oversee the various agencies. Workable with minimum disruption of the intelligence process. Takes care of prime Congressional complaints -- hazy lines of responsibility and an Intelligence IG. Requires firm guidelines to avoid undue power of individual -- "czar."

What about Congressional Oversight?

1. Leave resource oversight in Armed Forces Subcommittees. Intelligence items cannot be effectively separated from the budgets of the Departments served by intelligence.

2. Joint Oversight Committee. Should be comprised of ranking members of Armed Forces and Foreign Affairs Committees of both Houses. Saves briefing the uninformed and increasing the staff members privy to sensitive information.

3. "Super" oversight committee reported in press. Press reports of plan for detailed oversight of intelligence activities of CIA, DIA, NSA, FBI, and military intelligence units sound like the dreams of a temporary staff for permanent power and positions.

Would be a gross intrusion into Executive Branch and would probably destroy effective intelligence.

II. Discussion

There is now ongoing in both the Legislative and Executive Branches a ferment of activity regarding the future structure of the U.S. national intelligence apparatus. If not approached with a great deal of common sense the reorganization of intelligence could constitute the final crippling blow to this vital function of government which is already reeling under the effects of flagellation by the media, Congress and "insider" exposés. This paper is designed to lay out in brief form the principle factors which should guide any reorganizational schemes and to examine those options now being proposed.

First, what is the need for reorganization? Certainly, the findings of the Congressional committees on intelligence do not make the case for a massive overhaul of the intelligence apparatus implied by public statements of participants, nor for the destruction of CIA as advocated by a few public and Congressional commentators. What has been uncovered, however, is that the line of responsibility for covert actions by CIA is too hazy. Given the looseness of executive and Congressional control over covert action, it is remarkable that intelligence agencies have been found to be so rarely guilty of actions which can be construed as reprehensible. Underneath all the

sensationalism arising from Congressional investigation lies an important revelation: Covert action remains a necessary tool to promote U.S. interests abroad, but executive and legislative oversight of such action must be strengthened.

A second problem area surfaced by the Committees pertains to the alleged violation of the rights of U.S. citizens through communications intercept, mail openings, surveillance and the like. Such activities are as often connected with law enforcement as they are with intelligence gathering. Suffice it to say these are legal problems which will be solved by revision of directives covering them, not by reorganization of the intelligence apparatus.

Demonstrated -- more than proved -- by the investigations is the grievous damage done to U.S. intelligence capabilities by the broad dissemination of sensitive information. Congressional action is required to make it possible to ensure that persons privy to intelligence matters cannot with impunity ignore their responsibility to safeguard such information putting intelligenc operations, even lives, at risk. This is a matter for legislative action, not reorganization.

On the other hand, the investigations pointed up a need for an independent authority, not subordinate to the heads of agencies, to whom intelligence personnel can appeal when their consciences or sense of propriety demand that they complain outside of the

command channels. An Inspector General for Intelligence of some sort, not part of the agencies involved, is a need which can be met in reorganization.

Thus, from the Congressional investigations, only two factors bearing on reorganization emerge: the need for improved oversight of intelligence activity, specifically, covert action by the executive and legislative branches and the need for an independent Inspector General. But the prime factors driving the need for reorganization are quite independent of the investigations and scarcely illuminated by them. They are:

1. The changing intelligence mission in a changing world;
2. The impact of new technology on the intelligence function;
3. The belated awareness that all intelligence cannot be "centralized";
4. The inability of a sub-cabinet officer -- the Director of the CIA -- to impact effectively on the intelligence programs of cabinet officers.

The changing mission. The U.S. intelligence community today remains structured basically to deal with the simpler bi-polar world of the fifties and sixties when the prime intelligence question was: What are the military capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union? Of course, there was always some attention given to other areas and subjects, especially during times of crisis and conflict, but by far the bulk of the intelligence

assets of all intelligence agencies was focused on the U.S.-Soviet military equation. While that equation remains vitally important to U.S. decision makers, it is calculable today with considerable precision as compared to the fifties and early sixties (although the balance is interpreted in widely different ways). But today's world is not so simple; and questions such as: "What are the prospects for the Soviet harvest?", "Can Argentine technology support a nuclear weapons program?", "What are the Arabs doing with oil revenues?", "Will the French sell helicopters to Iran?" have become equally vital to U.S. interests. In other words, political and economic intelligence on a wide variety of target countries has become critical to good national decision making. This requires new efforts to collect, process and analyze polito-economic intelligence, most of which efforts will be manpower intensive. And it is unlikely that the intelligence community will be allowed a sharp increase in manpower to carry the new load. What this means to any reorganization is that the current broad overlap among agencies on purely military intelligence matters must be reduced to the minimum which still assures an independent review of those military intelligence judgments of interest to the very top of the government.

In the tactical field, the nature of the intelligence requirement has also changed over the past several years. Once the essential intelligence needs for U.S. commanders were "strength, capability, and disposition" of the enemy forces. With this

intelligence he could prepare for tomorrow's, next week's, or even next year's battle. Today he must be prepared for a devastating and critical first battle at all times. This means he needs much more timely and precisely detailed intelligence on potential enemy forces. He is now opposed by modern military technology, especially powerful long-range weaponry, which must be monitored constantly. In any war between forces employing such weapons, defeat or victory can be determined in a matter of hours, perhaps minutes. There is no time to crank up the commander's intelligence apparatus after the start of hostilities. What this means with regard to reorganization schemes is that the needs of the forces in the field and fleets at sea, including their needs for intelligence support from national systems, must not be ignored in the enthusiasm for centralization. If we are not careful, we will diminish the war-fighting and deterrent capabilities of U.S. arms by concentrating too narrowly on the needs of Washington-level intelligence users.

Impact of New Technology: U.S. collection systems are entering an era where the large expensive systems are capable of providing precise information on events as they happen. Modern communication allows this intelligence to be passed to field commanders in a matter of minutes or hours. This situation contrasts with the past capabilities of such systems which provided good information, but generally on an historical basis -- that is, they told us what the situation was a few weeks or a month or so ago. Thus the new systems will be of infinitely more value in crisis

and combat situations. What this means to reorganization is this: (a) the day-to-day tasking and control of new systems must be in the hands of the crisis and conflict managers (as opposed to the current management by interagency committees, and (b) quick dissemination of intelligence at a low enough classification to be used by deployed forces must be possible through the military chain of command.

Intelligence cannot be "centralized". The case that military intelligence cannot be centralized can be inferred from the foregoing arguments. Intelligence is a vital function of every level of military organization and can no more be centralized in Washington than can "operations" or "logistics." Every commander will require some assets responsible to himself. This is not to say that there are not legitimate tradeoffs between "national" systems and, say, the reconnaissance aircraft conducting intelligence missions. In fact, as the new national capabilities discussed earlier come into being, such tradeoffs will undoubtedly take place. But tradeoffs between Army reconnaissance battalions and satellites are extremely unlikely to eventualize. Even within the Department of Defense, it is illogical to speak of "centralizing" all military intelligence activities. (DIA has been criticized by some for not accomplishing this centralization -- a job which DIA cannot do, should not attempt, and was not set up for.)

Since more than three quarters of the U.S. intelligence effort pertains to the various levels of military intelligence, it follows that if that sector cannot and should not become highly centralized, the centralization of political, economic, scientific, and law-enforcement intelligence with military intelligence makes even less sense. What this means to reorganization schemes is that line authority from any U.S. intelligence "czar" over the departmental, bureau or agency intelligence resources is a totally unworkable concept.

The inability of a Director of the CIA to oversee the entire U.S. intelligence effort. The foregoing arguments concerning centralization in general are at the root of the problem of dual-hatting the Director of the CIA as a national authority over all U.S. intelligence efforts. Unless given direct line authority over departmental resources, the Director of the CIA cannot be expected to perform effectively even those limited oversight duties reflected in past NSC and presidential directives. (Mr. Colby has done a remarkably fine job of coordinating intelligence community affairs, but this was largely the result of his style of conducting community business and the close personal relationships between him and the other key intelligence chiefs. Success in the current system of dual-hatting the Director of the CIA is critically personality dependent.) Such direct line authority of the Director of the CIA over departmental resources is unlikely to be granted and would not work in any case.

Three out of four dollars in national intelligence programs are in the Defense Budget, but the CIA remains a bureaucratic contender for the intelligence dollar. One cannot logically expect the Director of the CIA to judge objectively between programs promoted by the CIA and those promoted by other agencies With the best of will (such as Mr. Colby has applied), the Director of the CIA will be unable to resist the pressure from within his own agency on important resource issues.

For instance, an intelligence resource issue involving very large expenditures arose during the past budget cycle. The program had been conceived and managed by CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology and was designed to collect information of prime interest to DOD, not CIA. Views in DOD ranged from lukewarm on the program to strong opposition. Nonetheless, it was quite naturally vigorously defended by its managers at the CIA and the Director of the CIA eventually yielded to his own staff. The President was urged to support the program and he did. Eventually the program was eliminated in joint conference by Congress.

Whatever the merits of the positions taken and eventual resolution of this matter are, it illustrates the weakness of the notion that the Director of the CIA can be expected to wear two hats -- one as manager of a large, important and competitive agency, and the other as arbiter of issues affecting all agencies.

Since the inception of the CIA, the dual-hat concept has existed -- the Director of the CIA was also the Director of Central Intelligence, and as such was charged with leadership of the entire community effort. However, the Directors of CIA, with the exception of James Schlesinger and William Colby, concentrated their attention on CIA business. In intelligence community affairs, they emerged but rarely and then more in the role of adversary than spokesman. To CIA staffs, on the other hand, the Director's role as community leader presented an irrestible bureaucratic imperative to devise mechanisms permitting control or absorption of the intelligence activities of other agencies. As a result, CIA today contains elements competing with the National Security Agency's mission of signals intercept, with the Air Force's mission of developing and operating satellite systems, with the Navy's mission of undersea intelligence collection, with State's mission of managing communications to embassies abroad, with the Defense Intelligence Agency's mission to produce basic military intelligence, and even for a time with FBI's domestic counterespionage and countersubversion missions.

These accretions of control in CIA staff elements resulted in extensive overlap of functions and in an adversary relationship growing up between that agency and all others in intelligence. It was particularly acute with the military intelligence elements. CIA's "customers" are the National Security Council

and the President; the needs of military customers, particularly those outside Washington, carried very little effective priority with CIA staffers. Regrettably, one aspect of the adversary relationship with the military was the tendency of CIA spokesmen to create and feed the myth that military intelligence agencies consistently produced bloated, self-serving intelligence and that CIA's reasoned, objective intelligence judgments were required to offset these deliberate Pentagon distortions. The record of military intelligence judgments over the past ten years or so simply doesn't bear that out.

The dual-hat concept and the resultant expansion of CIA staff functions also caused a dilution of attention to the CIA's primary unilateral responsibility -- clandestine collection of foreign intelligence and covert action in support of U.S. foreign policy. The broader the scope of CIA activity became, the more difficult it was to preserve the secrecy required for its central mission. For instance, the CIA chief in a foreign capital, if charged only with liaison with that country's clandestine intelligence service and the conduct of U.S. espionage efforts, could maintain a very low profile -- say, as a low-ranking embassy employee, or other inconspicuous cover. However, if he is charged with a broad spectrum of activity such as making arrangements with the local government for purchase of U.S. technical intelligence equipment, exchange of information with the local military people, and so forth, he can no longer

maintain clandestinity. He requires a title commensurate with his broad range of official contacts, a large office, secretarial help, and other trappings of a quasi-diplomat. Under such circumstances, the circle of persons, U.S. and foreign, who are privy to his CIA affiliation, is too broad to allow more than a pretense of secrecy about it.

CIA involvement in the development and management of large technical systems (e.g., the Glomar Explorer) with all the requisite contact with industry, contractors, labor forces, operating crews, etc., further weaken its capability to keep that which must be clandestine under cover. A Director of CIA responsible essentially for clandestine and covert operations can stick to a "no comment" policy in response to the news media; a Director of CIA as spokesman for the entire U.S. intelligence effort and as the substantive intelligence inputter to national decisions cannot get away with the "no comment" response.

The foregoing discussion of the drawbacks resulting from attempts to "double hat" the Director of the CIA should not detract from the fact that the CIA has more often than not improved overall U.S. intelligence operations when it moved into areas outside the clandestine field. CIA has always been a well-funded and well-staffed organization. Freedom from the strictures of regular Civil Service rules and regulations and from detailed oversight by the Office of Management and Budget and the Congress permitted the Agency to attract extraordinary

talent and apply it efficiently. CIA's entry in a big way into the development of high technology systems was with the U-2 program. At the time of the decision to produce an aircraft and camera system capable of safely conducting overhead reconnaissance deep inside Soviet territory, the natural candidate in government to develop and manage the system was the Air Force. But the Air Force was simply incapable then of undertaking the task with the degree of secrecy required. CIA was, and its success in the effort was truly remarkable. The corps of technicians at CIA, once established, remained and has contributed importantly to the development of other high technology collection systems. CIA's entry into other fields has also been marked by improvement of the overall intelligence support to national authorities -- not always commensurate with the problems and frictions generated, however. Further CIA staffs created to solve problems which at the time were not otherwise solvable have taken on a bureaucratic life of their own. The Air Force today, for instance, can develop and manage a U-2 system or a satellite system with as much or more dispatch as the CIA.

The thrust of the above argumentation means this to any reorganization: (a) it is imperative that the functions of the head of the CIA and the overseer of the total U.S. intelligence effort be separated; and, (b) CIA's function must be more narrowly focused on the critical and highly sensitive field of clandestine intelligence abroad and covert action.

III. Summation

Executive Branch examination of reorganization has produced four options which boil down essentially to these:

(a) Leave the intelligence community as is;

(b) Give the Director of the CIA direct line authority over other intelligence agencies;

(c) Establish a separate position at White House level (NSC) to oversee the various agencies;

(d) Subordinate the Director of the CIA to the Secretary of Defense of State. There are variations on each of these items, usually reflecting the grinding of more specialized bureaucratic axes.

The "as-is" option has one cardinal virtue. It is the least disruptive. The complex, delicate, and sorely distressed U.S. intelligence apparatus cannot survive ham-handedness at this juncture. But it seems hardly likely that it would be politically feasible to do nothing to strengthen Executive oversight except exhort the Director of Central Intelligence to exert better leadership. Also, the adverse impact of the Congressional inquiries on the image of the CIA makes the previously awkward problems associated with dual-hatting the Director now overwhelmingly difficult. The Director of the CIA's effectiveness as intelligence community leader is heavily dependent on positive attitudes toward his leadership from leaders and rank and file in other agencies. It is too much to hope that the CIA's image problem even though largely undeserved, will not impact severely

on the Director of Central Intelligence's leadership role.

The "as-is" solution was working rather well before the impact of the Congressional inquiries was felt. In response to the Nixo directive of November 1971 calling for positive community leadership by the Director of Central Intelligence, Doctor Schlesinger set up an Intelligence Community Staff headed up by a uniformed officer and staffed by all agencies -- not just CIA people as previous ineffective "community" staffs had been. He gave the Community Staff a voice equal to the internal CIA staff and as often as not ruled on issues in accordance with the Intelligence Community staff advice and against internal CIA considerations. Mr. Colby followed that example and the cooperation within the Community was never better. However, the perfectly understandable pressures on CIA for emphasis on self preservation in the light of Congressional and public attack stunted this development. The Intelligence Community staff has become almost dysfunctional, having very little impact on the affairs of CIA and the community. It is extremely doubtful that this situation could be repaired in the foreseeabl future. Thus the "as-is" option is not feasible.

Option (b) which would sharply increase the power of CIA over the other intelligence agencies seems to have even less political visability than the "as-is" option. It is hard to imagine CIA being given more power over U.S. intelligence activities in the current climate of public opinion. Even if this were possible, the option contains the unworkable facet of outside line authorit

over the intelligence functions of the various departments.

Option (d), subordination of CIA to Defense or State, would probably be strongly resisted by those departments. Congress would probably strongly resist "aggrandizement" of the Pentagon, and would certainly resist direct subordination to State so long as Mr. Kissinger is Secretary. It is a very poor solution in any case with respect to the impact on clandestine collection and covert action. As pointed out earlier, separation of these functions even from other less sensitive intelligence functions is essential; separation from regular military and diplomatic functions is even more critical.

Option (c), the creation of an oversight position separate from that of Director of Central Intelligence, is the only one of the basic options which is both feasible and meets the actual needs for executive oversight. Further this option can be executed without drastic upheaval in the intelligence community. The good features of the current structure for coordination of intelligence community activities can be preserved, and the proper demands of Congress met.

The responsibilities of this new officer (for the purpose of this paper, the Coordinator of U.S. Intelligence), require careful consideration. Essentially, he should be responsible for the following:

(a) Principal intelligence advisor to the President and the National Security Council;

(b) Chairman of all interagency intelligence boards

and committees (e.g., U.S. Intelligence Board, Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, the Executive Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, the "40" Committee);

(c) Protection of intelligence sources and methods;

(d) Preparation for the President of a National Intelligence Program with resource allocation recommendations;

(e) Establishment and supervision of an Inspector General's office for national intelligence;

(f) Interface with appropriate Congressional bodies on matters of policies, resource allocation, and operations;

(g) Supervision of the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates and their dissemination.

There are two aspects of this solution which should be guarded against by the President and the Congress, or both. The first is the danger of concentration of power in the hands of one man; the second is the creation of a stifling bureaucratic layer over U.S. intelligence activities. To avoid these possibilities the following instructions should apply:

1. The Coordinator shall be approved by the Senate.

2. If the Coordinator is military or retired military, his deputy shall be civilian, and vice versa.

3. The Coordinator shall not have line authority over the various intelligence agencies and bureaus.

4. The professional staff, for all functions, shall be limited to 100 persons with 50 persons in administrative support and shall not be augmented without notification of Congress.

5. The professional staff shall be drawn from the various agencies of the Intelligence Community with not more than 40 percent originating from any one agency.

6. The professional staff will serve a fixed term and be returned to the originating agency for at least one year before reappointment.

The above instructions would ensure that the Office of the Coordinator would not become an entity with a bureaucratic life of its own. Staffers could not make a career out of serving in the Office, and an institutional bias or basic point of view would be inhibited.

Coordination Staff: The transfer of the current Intelligence Community Staff to the Office of the Coordinator would take care of most immediate staffing needs. Some adjustments would be necessary due to the fact that with its decline in stature, the numbers of non-CIA officers on the staff have diminished.

Substantive Staff: There would be a need to reinstitute in the office of the Coordinator an entity resembling the old Office of National Estimates (ONE) or to beef up somewhat the staffs of the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) that replaced ONE. This staff should remain small, drawing as the

NIOs do now on the analytical capabilities of the community to make inputs and prepare first drafts of estimates.

IG Staff: This staff section would have to be created from scratch. It should be headed by a person with a broad knowledge of intelligence but should include one or two non-intelligence professionals. It should be made abundantly clear to personnel in intelligence that the Coordinator's IG is to hear complaints of personnel pertinent to possible abuse of the intelligence function, not personal grievances against supervisors, promotions equal opportunity and the like. Constrained to the investigation of abuse complaints, this staff should not need more than five personnel.

Resource Control: The basic budgeting process of intelligence resources should not be tinkered with. It works. Any attempt to pull the intelligence items from departmental budgets to create a formal "Intelligence Budget" with funds controlled by the Coordinator would create an administrative nightmare and a never-ending bureaucratic struggle over the definitions of "intelligence resource" and "intelligence-related resource." However, as the Intelligence Community Staff has done over the past few years, a National intelligence program can be prepared in which the Coordinator supports or non-supports the pertinent intelligence resource requests of the Departments. This system gives the Coordinator strong leverage but not veto power over what intelligence resource requests to in or stay out of budgets.

The establishment of a Coordinator at White House level will not, of course, cure all that ails intelligence. It does not eliminate the overlap between CIA and other agency functions. It does not restore the necessary emphasis in CIA on clandestine and covert operations. It does not clarify the relationships of law-enforcement, counter-intelligence, and countersubversion between the FBI and the intelligence agencies. It does not establish the proper legal basis to safeguard U.S. secrets. These are matters which should be given as missions to the Coordinator when established. His first order of business should be the revision of the National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) and Director, Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs) which govern intelligence community activities at the national level. This should be coordinated with legislative proposals to set before the Congress and completed by mid-1976. The setting up of the Office of Coordinator should be the first and only reorganizational step to be taken now.

The only argument mustered in Executive Branch proposals against the separation of intelligence community coordination function from the Director, CIA, is that the Coordinator would not be able to function without an "institutional base." The argument, as one might expect, comes from the CIA itself which resists the sharp diminution of CIA dominance entailed in such separation The argument is an extremely weak one. The Coordinator, with direct access to the President, the Congress and the National Security Council, would not lack for clout because he did not

also "own" the CIA. To accept the objection, one would have to believe that Henry Kissinger, prior to his appointment as Secretary of State, lacked power because he had only a National Security Council staff and no "institutional base."

Congressional Oversight: Resource oversight by Congress should remain in the committees and subcommittees now handling these matters. The indivisibility of the intelligence function from the other functions of the Departments makes separate presentation and separate defense of intelligence budget requests to Congress unwieldy if not infeasible. Certainly, military intelligence matters cannot be dealt with effectively in isolation from considerations of military force structure, weaponry and strength.

It would appear that the prime concern of Congress for stronger oversight is in the area of covert actions in support of foreign policy. A widely supported solution is a Joint Committee on Intelligence.

If such a committee is organized, it would be most effective if it were composed of legislators already versed in intelligence matters and foreign affairs. A committee of the chairmen and ranking minority members of Armed Forces and Foreign Affairs Committees would be able to deal with issues involving covert actions with dispatch and without the necessity to enlarge sharply the numbers of staff people privy to very sensitive matters. A Committee of this nature could be briefed on a regular basis as to the status of ongoing covert actions, such briefings being the responsibility of the Coordinator.

There have been press reports of grandiose schemes for Congressional oversight apparently hatched by staffs of the Congressional investigating committees. These schemes purport to place intelligence activities of the CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI and even military units in the field under direct and detailed review of Congress. It is not likely that such a gross intrusion into the executive function by Congress would ever come to fruition. Such notions, if they in fact are in the form of a plan, probably represent the dreams of position and power of the staff people themselves. Certainly no Congressman could devote to such activity even a tiny fraction of the time which it would require. Turning over such broad responsibilities to a Congressional staff would wreak havoc with intelligence.